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ABSTRACT 
Proliferation resistance features that reduce the likelihood of diversion of nuclear materials from 
the civilian nuclear power fuel cycle are critical for a global nuclear future.  A framework that 
monitors process information continuously can demonstrate the ability to resist proliferation by 
measuring and reducing diversion risk, thus ensuring the legitimate use of the nuclear fuel cycle.  
The automation of new nuclear facilities requiring minimal manual operation makes this possible 
by generating instantaneous system state data that can be used to track and measure the status of 
the process and material at any given time. 
 
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) are working 
in cooperation to develop an advanced transparency framework capable of assessing diversion 
risk in support of overall plant transparency.  The “diversion risk” quantifies the probability and 
consequence of a host nation diverting nuclear materials from a civilian fuel cycle facility.  This 
document introduces the details of the diversion risk quantification approach to be demonstrated 
in the fuel handling training model of the MONJU Fast Reactor.   
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
A key objective to the global deployment of nuclear technology is maintaining transparency 
among nation-states and international communities to assure the safe and legitimate use of 
nuclear material and related technology.  Proliferation resistance features that prevent theft or 
diversion of nuclear material and reduce the probability of proliferation are critical for a global 
nuclear future.   
 
The automation of new nuclear facilities requiring minimal manual operation provides an 
opportunity to utilize the abundance of process information for monitoring proliferation risk.  A 
framework that monitors process information continuously can lead to greater transparency of 
nuclear fuel cycle activities and can demonstrate the ability to resist proliferation associated with 
these activities.   
 
Proliferation occurs in three stages: materials acquisition (with a focus on what occurs at the 
facility), materials transformation, and weapons fabrication.  For the purpose of this document, 
diversion is defined as the process through which a host nation diverts fissile material from a 
declared fuel cycle facility with the intention of generating nuclear weapons; it refers only to the 
acquisition of nuclear materials.  Facility misuse (undeclared production) is not taken into 
account in this document and is beyond the scope of the current project.  Threats of acquisition 
of nuclear materials from a declared facility not conducted by the host nation are considered 
theft.  Although the technology framework described in this document is designed to collect and 
analyze the facility data and should be capable of detecting undeclared movement of material 
regardless of who is the originator (i.e., host country or other groups), theft threats are not 
considered within the scope of this project.  
 
Sandia National Laboratories and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency are working in cooperation 
to develop an advanced transparency framework capable of assessing proliferation or diversion 
risk in support of overall nuclear plant transparency.  Within this framework, diversions of 
material from the facility can be detected as they occur.  For demonstration purposes, we are 
calculating risk of diversion at a MONJU-style Fast Breeder Reactor. 
 
The term “transparency” is used in many different applications.  In the context of the nuclear fuel 
cycle, we define it as:  
“…a high-level concept, defined as a confidence building approach among political 
entities, possibly in support of multi-lateral agreements, to ensure civilian nuclear 
facilities are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons.  Additionally, 
nuclear fuel cycle transparency involves the cooperative sharing of relevant nuclear 
material, process, and facility information among all authorized parties to ensure the safe 
and legitimate use of nuclear material and technology.  A system is considered 
transparent when the parties involved feel that the proliferation risk is at an acceptable 
level.  For this to occur, proliferation risk should be monitored in a continuous fashion.”  
(Love et al., 2006) 
 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Transparency can be further categorized into four accumulating levels: 
  8 
1. Bilateral or multilateral agreements on the operation, inspection, and verification of 
nuclear operations within a host country. 
2. Added surveillance and remote monitoring of nuclear operations usually at random or 
without notification. 
3. Direct monitoring of nuclear operations instantaneously.  
4. Ability to remotely secure and inhibit operations. 
 
The highest levels of transparency imply multilateral control of nuclear facilities and processes.  
This project represents the first attempt to implement a Level 3 Transparency System at any 
location, whether foreign or domestic.  The present report introduces a methodology for 
analyzing the data obtained from a directly monitored advanced transparency system and their 
integration into the calculation of diversion risk for plant operations. 
 
For a background and a holistic understanding of the project scope and goals, please refer to the 
conceptual framework of this methodology, documented in SAND2006-0270: A Framework and 
Methodology for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Transparency (Love et al., 2006).  An extension of these 
transparency concepts is discussed in the above referenced document. 
 
  9 
2.0 TRANSPARENCY FRAMEWORK: REVIEW AND DEFINITIONS  
The Advanced Transparency Framework is comprised by secure technologies to be found in two 
different locations: (1) the host nuclear facility generating the information and (2) the remote site 
analyzing the data.  Data is collected from the nuclear facility by a secure sensor signal database 
server located at the host facility.  The data is then encrypted and transmitted through a Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) to the sensor signal database located at the remote site.  The remote site 
hosts the Transparency Toolbox and the Transparency Analysis Software, which contain the core 
functionality for evaluating the signals, calculating the diversion risk and developing 
recommendations to support transparency of the facility.   
 
The goal of the analysis is to assess the diversion risk instantaneously via analysis of 
continuously reported sensor information.  Following the analysis, the values obtained can be 
used to recommend changes to reduce diversion risk and provide feedback to the site and other 
authorized parties.  The framework is designed to monitor diversion risk levels in support of an 
acceptable level of proliferation risk.  Figure 1 displays the framework of advanced nuclear fuel 
cycle transparency. 
 
 
Figure 1: Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycle Transparency Framework 
 
 
In order to better understand the risk analysis model in context of this transparency framework, 
several definitions are required. 
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Proliferation Risk:  Proliferation risk is often defined as the risk of acquisition, transformation 
and weapons fabrication.  For the purpose of this document, “proliferation risk” is the risk that a 
facility can be used for proliferation by the host country.  This risk is assumed to be an 
acceptable risk when the facility operates under normal conditions as declared by licensing and 
export control agreements. 
  
Diversion Risk:  The “diversion risk” is the risk of diverting nuclear material through the 
declared operations.  This concept incorporates both the probability of a host nation diverting 
nuclear materials from a commercial facility and the consequences of such a diversion.  
Diversion risk is quantified, herein, in terms of significant quantities (SQs) of nuclear material 
potentially diverted within a specific period of time or cycle measurement (day, month, 
operation, process).  For the purpose of this document, diversion risk will be calculated 
instantaneously (real-time) from process data. 
 
Transparency Database1 (webservice): The Transparency Database1/webservice stores 
information collected from the Monju Model and provides a communication protocol for 
transferring that data to the Transparency Toolbox.  The database consists of XML formatted 
sensor signal files collected during activity of the model.  The webservice operates as a client-
server system allowing data transfer queries to pass through SOAP communication protocol.  
The data is encrypted at the server, located at the site of the facility, and transferred to the client, 
or remote site making the query request, where the information is decrypted.  This information is 
transferred through a Virtual Private Network (VPN). 
 
Secure communications:  During the information transfer process, encryption algorithms are 
provided to encrypt or scramble information being requested from the remote site, or client of the 
webservice. 
 
Transparency Database2:  After information is transferred from the Server to the Client, an 
XML Controller parses through the information and populates the Transparency Database2 into 
the proper format for use in an analysis.  The database consists of the primary data coming from 
the model and secondary data identifying specific attributes about each signal. 
 
Transparency Toolbox:  The Transparency Toolbox is the main Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
at the remote site.  The Toolbox is used to display information transferred via the webservice.  
The minute amount of processing at the Toolbox level involves time constraints and signal order-
of-operation evaluations.  For instance, if a sensor is activated outside of a particular time 
constraint, or if a sensor is activated out of order, an error indicator is activated with an error 
description at the Transparency Toolbox level. 
 
Transparency Software: The Transparency Analysis Software conducts the operational 
verification and calculates the proliferation risk of a nuclear facility.  The software incorporates 
analysis tools in the form of a risk model to quantitatively evaluate the process data, using 
information from the Transparency Toolbox to calculate the expected and observed risk 
parameters.  The continuous stream of information provided by the software will yield a timely 
proliferation assessment.  This analysis is necessary to design, support, and maintain transparent 
systems. 
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Plant Process and Plant/Operational Process Data:  “Plant process” refers to the collection of 
physical events that take place during normal plant operations.  An example is using a crane to 
move material from one location to another.  The term “plant process data” or “operational 
process data” is used to represent operational data normally generated by the plant independent 
of any advanced transparency requirements or efforts.  A basic assumption in the development of 
the transparency framework is that the plant process is automated and that the abundance of plant 
process data generated during operations is immediately available for analysis.  (We assume, for 
this study, that plant data is secure and tamper resistant.) 
 
Process Flow: “Process flow” refers to the movement, activity, or any processes associated with 
the nuclear material in the fuel handling cycle at a specific facility.  Process flow information is 
crucial for the analysis because it provides the foundation for the development of expected 
signals from the facility, based on a facility activity manifest.  This information is well defined, 
structured, organized, and placed into the secure facility database.  Implementation of the 
transparency framework at any location requires examining process flow information for each 
nuclear facility type on a plant-wide basis.  This specificity and flexibility of the framework 
allows for ease of implementation in all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. 
 
Sensors and Monitors:  Sensors and monitors convey specific information about the operational 
processes of the facility.  A “sensor” detects the status of the various conditions of the plant, 
whether it is temperature, motion, position, et cetera, and does not require interpretation.  A 
sensor can provide either binary information (e.g., on/off) or analog information (e.g., 
temperature).   
 
There are two types of sensors: intrinsic and extrinsic.  An “intrinsic sensor” is a sensor that 
transmits signals inherent to the system (for example, identifies the binary plant process events 
by following voltage during plant operations) and generates what was previously defined as 
“plant process data.”  The information gathered by the intrinsic sensors is part of the existing 
operation system, without transparency in place.   
 
An “extrinsic sensor” is an added sensor that is not needed for plant operations and monitors 
material properties such as mass, temperature, et cetera, which may be needed to calculate the 
diversion risk.  This sensor is added to the system solely for advanced transparency 
measurements as an additional verification device to manage the risk.  Extrinsic sensors are not 
currently incorporated into the risk model, as diversion risk will be first calculated with 
information intrinsic to the facility.  In the future, the location of extrinsic sensors should be 
determined to further support the calculation of diversion.   
 
A “monitor” is a data-gathering tool that is also added to the system for transparency purposes.  
However, in contrast to extrinsic sensors, information transmitted by monitors is subject to 
interpretation by the analyst.  Monitors, such as video cameras and inspectors, allow the analyst 
to observe an operation.  Monitors are not currently incorporated into the risk model, as 
diversion risk will be first calculated with information intrinsic to the facility.  In the future, the 
location of monitors should be determined to further support the calculation of diversion risk.   
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Significant Quantity:  A “significant quantity” (SQ) of a specific material is the minimum 
amount of that material needed to develop a nuclear weapon.  This measurement presents a 
means for addressing the material attractiveness or quality of a specific fissile isotope and will be 
used in the development of a quantitative risk approach as a measure of the consequence of 
successful diversion. 
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3.0 PLANT DESIGN AND SENSOR USAGE 
Plant design has a significant impact on the risk modeling process and the calculation of 
diversion risk for a specific facility.  Once the required plant operations are detailed in a process 
flow diagram, sensor placement must be addressed.  Every plant operation is assumed to have as 
many associated sensors as are necessary to (1) verify that the remote operation took place and 
(2) provide feedback to the associated automation systems.  These intrinsic sensors will verify 
movement of plant equipment and yield data in a binary form (i.e., operating or not operating).  
The length of time between readings and sequence of operations of intrinsic sensors will be part 
of the process flow diagram and will also be collected as input to the transparency toolbox.   
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4.0 RISK MODEL 
It has previously been stated by Love et al. (2006) that proliferation risk, and ultimately fuel 
cycle transparency, is a function of material attractiveness, a static (baseline) risk, and a dynamic 
(changing) risk.  For simplicity and comprehensiveness, we will now redefine the terminology 
proposed in that document.   
 
The calculation of proliferation risk from a process step is assumed to be directly related to the 
risk of a host nation diverting material from the process.  Hereafter, the risk model addresses this 
specific calculation as diversion risk.   
 
A fundamental component of the “diversion risk model” is the comparison of “expectations” and 
“observations.”  Declared plant operations have an expected sequence of events, and when these 
events are conducted in the expected manner, a set of signals are generated for these events by 
the sensors.  This set of signals is referred to herein as the set of expectations or expected signals.  
The expectations are based on the detailed process flow, declared operations, and diversion 
routes.  Expectations account for the diversion risk under normal operations.  The observations 
are the set of sensor signals recorded by the same monitoring sensors during actual operations at 
the facility. 
 
An instantaneous comparison between expectations and observations provides the foundation for 
the calculation of diversion risk.  A deviation from expectations (a discrepancy between expected 
and observed signals) represents an opportunity for diversion of radioactive materials.  When a 
deviation occurs, the transparency system detects the discrepancy and adjusts the risk calculation 
according to the model proposed in this document.   
 
This document defines diversion as the action of “diverting nuclear material through the declared 
operations,” whereas deviation is solely a “discrepancy between expected and observed signals” 
as detected by the sensors.  Deviations are specific and limited to the information generated by 
the sensors and can occur under several circumstances, such as an unexpected time delay in the 
process or a sensor malfunction. A deviation is a flag to indicate that diversion might be 
occurring; it is not an indicator of diversion certainty.  However, although sensor failures and 
time delays can be considered within the normal range of automated systems events, they are 
anomalies in the declared process and can increase the chances of successful diversion (e.g., a 
sensor that malfunctions would not detect a diversion, a time delay provides opportunity for 
manipulating the automated system). For this reason, all detected deviations will trigger an 
adjustment in the diversion risk calculation that will likely increase the diversion risk for that 
operation. 
 
The “diversion risk model” introduced in this document considers two types of risk: expected 
and observed risk.  We suggest that the concepts of “static” and “dynamic” risk that were 
discussed in Love et al. (2006) are instead “expected” and “observed” risk.  These concepts are 
further developed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.  We outline the diversion risk model in the following 
subsections.  
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4.1 Expected Risk 
 
The “expected risk” is the risk introduced by the existence of the facility based on planned and 
declared operations.  This risk represents the normal baseline risk and is dependent upon plant 
design and processing capabilities.  The plant design should have the goal of making this amount 
as small as possible.  All planned activities from a facility are communicated to the risk analysts 
before operations begin.  Risk analysts use this information to develop a set of “expected 
signals” that will be generated by the model prior to the execution of declared operations.   
 
While the expected risk can never be equal to zero, due to uncertainties and the possibility of 
overlooking possible routes for diversion during the design of the plant, a careful and 
comprehensive plant design will minimize this risk.  The value of expected risk will be expressed 
in terms of the rate of significant quantities per unit of time or process (e.g., SQs/process) and 
represents the amount of material that may be diverted without detection over a predetermined 
amount of time or during the completion of a specific process.  The expected risk is calculated 
for individual process steps based on the technologies, sensors, and plant design, including 
considerations for materials type and event consequences.  The plant expected risk will be 
calculated by aggregating the calculated expected risk at every plant step, including transition 
points from one-step to another.  
 
4.2 Observed Risk 
 
The “observed risk” is measured instantaneously when the plant is operating and is based on the 
signals transmitted by sensors during the completion of declared operations.  Observed risk is 
calculated at every process step via a comparison of actual operations to planned and declared 
operations (the foundation for expected risk).  Real-time raw data from sensors is aggregated in 
the transparency toolbox to detect deviations.  A baseline risk file containing the calculated 
expected risk based on declared operations will be compared to an alternate working file being 
fed by real-time process data, evaluating the status of the sensors according to estimated 
operation times and predicted timetags.  This information is transmitted to the risk analysis 
software where a value of observed risk for each process step is calculated.  The observed risk 
will accumulate over the same span of time as the expected risk.   
 
 
4.3 Expectations and Observations 
 
The Advanced Transparency Framework assumes that all planned operations from a facility are 
communicated to the risk analysts before they begin.  These declarations are used to develop a 
set of “expectations” or “expected signals” that represent what the facility sensors should 
transmit if the operation goes according to plan, without any deviation.  During operations, 
expectations are the binary status [on/off] expected from each sensor according to the 
declaration.  “Observations” or “observed signals” are the binary status [on/off] signals actually 
transmitted by sensors while operations are taking place.   
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When the information is being transmitted, the risk analysis software performs a comparison 
between the expectations and observations to determine if they match.  The software then 
determines if the operation has occurred as expected (expected = observed) or if a deviation has 
been reported (expected ≠ observed). 
 
4.4 Components of Risk 
 
For the purposes of this document, the risk of an event occurring has two components: the 
probability that the event will happen and the consequences of such an event if it did occur.  The 
risk is calculated by taking the product of the probability and the consequence.  The diversion 
risk model presented herein assesses the probability that a diversion has occurred by interpreting 
the set of observed signals for an operation.  For simplicity in the risk calculation, we will utilize 
a “significant quantity” (SQ) as the measure of consequence.  Diversion risk will be based on the 
fraction or total number of SQs that may be diverted from the facility within a specified 
timeframe or process. 
 
4.4.1 Probability 
 
The diversion risk model compares the set of observed signals with the expected signals to 
calculate the probability component of the diversion risk.  This section discusses the concepts 
used to estimate the probability that a diversion has occurred (P), conditional on the observed 
sensor data.  Because this probability calculation is dependent upon the sensor data, it is a 
conditional probability.  For the sake of brevity, later uses of the term “probability that a 
diversion has occurred, conditional on sensor data” will omit the phrase “conditional on sensor 
data.” 
 
The risk model presented herein assumes that each process step has as many associated sensors 
as are necessary to verify that the remote operation took place.  This assumption leads to the 
following set of four scenarios for a single process step: 
 
Scenario 1:  If no diversion occurs and the sensor is functioning correctly (i.e., no malfunction), 
the sensor will not report a deviation from expected operations. 
 
Scenario 2: If a diversion occurs and the sensor functions correctly, the sensor will report a 
deviation from expected operations. 
 
Scenario 3: If no diversion occurs but the sensor malfunctions, the sensor will report a deviation 
from expected operations.  This scenario is termed a “false positive.” 
 
Scenario 4: When a diversion occurs but the sensor malfunctions, the sensor will not report a 
deviation from expected operations.  This scenario is termed a “miss” and represents why the 
diversion risk is not equal to zero even if a sensor does not report a deviation from expected 
operations. 
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Figure 2 illustrates these scenarios. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Sensor Malfunction and Diversion Scenarios 
 
The model used to calculate the probability that a diversion has occurred, P, for an individual 
process step involves two factors: 1) the probability that a diversion will occur during that step 
(PD) and 2) the probability that the sensor monitoring that process step will malfunction and 
report incorrect data (PM).  Appendix A provides the mathematical details of how these 
probabilities are used to calculate P.  
 
Several factors such as design, location/environment, and function impact the frequency of 
sensor malfunction.  These factors have not been evaluated yet for the MONJU facility, so the 
method for calculating PM is not discussed in this document.  However, it should be noted that 
the sensors used in this calculation are intrinsic to the plant and are required to successfully 
operate the plant; the reliability of these sensors is extremely high.  Thus, it is expected that PM 
will be exceedingly low.  This is because plant equipment will be designed with reliability as a 
primary concern.  In addition, most of the equipment will have state of health signals that will 
indicate the likely failure of any equipment.   
 
The method of calculating PD for a process step has not been fully matured, but several 
contributing factors have been identified.  They include the location of the process step, the 
attractiveness of the materials being processed, and situational factors. 
 
Diversion Occurs 
Scenario 2: 
Diversion AND No 
Malfunction 
= Deviation Flagged 
Malfunction Occurs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 3:  
No Diversion AND  
Malfunction = Deviation 
Flagged 
Scenario 4:  
Diversion  
AND Malfunction  
= No Deviation  
Flagged 
Scenario 1: No Diversion AND No Malfunction = No Deviation Flagged 
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The location at which diversion begins must be considered when determining the possibility of 
diversion.  It takes into account the ease of diverting material out of the facility given a starting 
point.  It considers the physical barriers to removal of the diverted material: thus, the less 
physical barriers to exiting the facility the higher the location factor and the more physical 
barriers, the lower the location factor.   
 
Material attractiveness considers the usefulness of a material to a potential diverter, thus the term 
attractiveness.  It considers why a diverter would be more inclined to take a material with a small 
quantity of high purity plutonium over a larger quantity of lesser quality plutonium.  Thus, it 
considers the last two components of proliferation: processing and fabrication.   
 
A situation factor is used to supply a weighting factor for the probability of diversion.  A series 
of questions are asked, and depending on the answer, a weighting factor is considered.  For 
example, if a deviation in the process is reported, the first question asked is “Is material present 
in the room.”  If the answer is no a weighting factor of one is applied to indicate there is no 
change in the probability of diversion.  However, if the answer is yes, the questions are 
continued until a weighting factor is assigned.  The purpose of these questions is to assess the 
situations occurring at the reactor and determine if the situations affect the probability of 
diversion. 
 
Figure 3 summarizes the questions to be asked and corresponding weighting factors to assess 
material accessibility based on the situation. 
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Is material present 
in the room
Weighting factor =1Are regular 
operations occurring
Weighting factor =1Can the material fit 
through the hatch
Weighting factor =1Is the 
hatch open?
Weighting factor =1
Weighting factor =50 
Is the hatch 
external or internal
Weighting factor =100
YES NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
External Internal
 
 
Figure 3: Questions and Weighting Factors to Assess Material Accessibility Based on Situational Factors 
 
The locations, materials, and situational factors were qualitatively assessed, and a numerical 
weighting factor was assigned to each of these factors.  These numerical values will be used to 
scale the base rate of diversion to develop PD for a process step.  Table 1 lists the various 
locations in the MONJU plant in which process steps occur, and a proposed numerical 
quantification of these locations is given.  Table 2 provides the material classes for MONJU and 
their proposed corresponding material attractiveness values.  These tables were developed so that 
higher values indicate greater ease of diversion and greater attractiveness level, respectively.   
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Table 1: Locations of Process Steps in the MONJU Facility and Their Ease of Diversion Values 
Location* Ease of Diversion 
Reactor Building 0 
Reactor Vessel 1 
Fuel Handling Machine 1 
In-vessel Transfer Machine 1 
EVST 1 
EVTM 10 
Underwater Transporter 10 
Underfloor Transporter 20 
Spent Fuel Inspection 20 
Spent Fuel Cleaning System 20 
Spent Fuel Canning Station  20 
PIE Cask Pit 50 
Fresh Fuel Handling Room 90 
Shipping Cask Receiving and Shipping Station 100 
* Location is defined as an initiating point to begin diversion 
 Reactor Building is not an initiating point for diversion 
 
 
Table 2: Material Classes for the MONJU Facility and Their Attractiveness Levels 
Material Class 
Attractiveness 
Level 
Material Description 
Irradiated Blanket 
Material 
100 anything greater than 10 full operational days 
Fresh fuel 10 anything with a burnup less than 40MW 
Spent Fuel 5 
material with a burnup equal to or greater 
than 40MW 
Blanket Material 1 depleted uranium 
Control Rods 1 boron control rods 
Instrumentation Tubes 1 neutron detectors, etc 
 
4.4.2 Consequence 
For the purposes of this document, the consequence of diversion will be measured in terms of 
Significant Quantities (SQs).  SQs are defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) as the mass needed to manufacture a nuclear weapon.  Table 3 is a proposed relationship 
of items to SQs.  The information in this table will likely evolve with time as more information 
becomes available. 
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Table 3: SQ Consequence Measures Associated with Specific Items 
Item # SQ/Item 
Control Rods & Instrumentation Tubes 0.0 
Fresh Blanket Assembly 0.0 
Spent Reactor Fuel Assembly 0.2 
Fresh Reactor Fuel Assembly 0.6 
Irradiated Blanket Assembly 0.6 
 
 
4.5 Risk Calculations 
 
The diversion risk for an individual process step is the product of the probability that a diversion 
has taken place during that step and the consequences (in SQs) of a diversion occurring during 
that step.  To calculate the diversion risk of a process that is comprised of individual process 
steps, the risks for the individual steps are aggregated.  The diversion risk for the entire plant 
operation can be assessed by totaling the risks for the individual steps and processes.  Figure 4 
illustrates the risk hierarchy for a hypothetical plant operation consisting of three processes. 
 
 
Figure 4: Hierarchy of Risk for a Hypothetical Plant Operation Consisting of Three Processes 
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4.6 Format of Reported Data 
The numerical values reported by the transparency software will either be 1) the difference 
between the expected diversion risk and the observed diversion risk when point probabilities are 
used to model PM and PD or 2) the difference between the mean expected diversion risk and the 
mean observed diversion risk and the uncertainty associated with this difference when 
probability distributions are used to model PM and PD.   
 
See Appendix A for a discussion of when PM and PD should be modeled with a point 
probability or probability distribution. 
 
See Appendix B for a demonstration of how the risk model can be applicable to a MONJU-Style 
Fast Reactor based on the types of signals and information that is collected by the automated 
process. 
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5.0 FUTURE WORK   
5.1 Extrinsic Sensor and Monitor Placement 
An actual application of the advanced transparency system at a facility will also include extrinsic 
sensor placement.  Extrinsic sensors will be designed to measure material quantity either directly 
or indirectly.  The process flow diagram will be analyzed to identify locations where extrinsic 
sensors may be needed.  The extrinsic sensors will be used to verify the amount and type of 
material at strategic points within the facility, including storage rooms and receiving areas.  
5.2 Process Deviations and Their Effect on the Risk Calculation 
When deviations from expected process steps are detected, the model will incorporate the 
evaluation of correlations between intrinsic sensors.  The correlation between intrinsic sensors 
will rely on analyzing signal order and time relationships to determine if a deviation in the 
declared operation has actually occurred.  In addition, future work may involve the use of 
supplemental extrinsic sensors and monitors to verify declared operations versus observed 
operations in the event that a deviation in process steps was reported.  For example, if an 
intrinsic sensor detects an anomaly and sensor signal order cannot verify that no deviation has 
occurred, an extrinsic monitor or sensor may be able to determine whether the anomaly was 
triggered by equipment malfunction, safety override, or other circumstances.  The extrinsic 
sensors and monitors will also make it possible to verify if the material is still in the system, or if 
a diversion occurred.  This system of balance and checks will allow the risk analyst to make 
informed decisions when an increase in diversion risk is observed and will eliminate unnecessary 
interruptions of operations in the event that a deviation occurred but no diversion was verified by 
intrinsic signal order and time, extrinsic monitors, or extrinsic sensors. 
5.3 Signal Optimization 
The number of signals received for operations at a plant is large.  The massive amounts of data 
received for even small processes can bog down the transparency software.  It will be necessary 
to rank signal importance to minimize the number of signals that must be analyzed to sufficiently 
determine the diversion risk.  Signals with a high importance will primarily make up the data 
used in the risk calculation; whereas, signals with a medium or low ranking will be used as 
supplemental data that can be used when needed to ensure the accuracy of the risk calculation.  A 
diversion pathway analysis will be completed to identify areas where signals have a greater 
importance. 
5.4 Diversion Pathway Analysis 
A diversion pathway analysis will identify areas where material can be removed from the system 
and the pathway a diverter must follow to remove the material from the plant.  Areas that are 
identified as having a direct exit pathway would have a higher importance, and would potentially 
be areas where extrinsic sensors and monitors could be used to reduce diversion risk.  For areas 
that do not have a direct exit, the path the divertor must follow to leave the plant should be 
identified.  Extrinsic sensors and monitors could be installed along the possible diversion 
pathways to provide a surveillance method to detect material movement.  If material is found to 
be moving along a diversion pathway, the diversion risk would immediately indicate to the 
analysts that inspectors and regulators should be notified.  The transparency software would be 
  24 
able to follow the movement of material along the diversion pathway and identify areas where 
inspectors should look to find the diverted material.   
5.5 Development of PM and PD  
The methods for calculating the probability of sensor failure (PM) and the probability that a 
diversion will occur at a process step (PD) have not been fully matured.  These calculations will 
be developed for implementation in the transparency software. 
5.6 Additional Risk Considerations  
The risk analysis framework is being developed for evaluating proliferation risk as a basis of any 
nuclear fuel cycle independent of country, political sensitivities and other factors that may be 
considered relevant for a comprehensive evaluation of the risk environment.  Such 
considerations may later be included in the model in a customized module that may allow the 
risk analyst to increase or decrease diversion risk as necessary based on other factors that would 
affect the probability of diversion. 
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS/PROGRESS 
The natural progression of the transparency framework suggests that the development and 
demonstration of qualitative and quantitative risk analysis methods should be preceded by a 
demonstration of the secure communications and data transfer from the two sites involved in the 
analysis.  A demonstration of secure communications between the location generating the data 
and the location analyzing it will guarantee the integrity of the data in support of neglecting the 
risk associated from remote communications and data interference from the calculation of 
proliferation risk. 
 
Once secure communications are established, a demonstration of the quantitative risk concept 
and its qualitative interpretation can be documented for specific operations of the fuel cycle.  
These operations will later be integrated into a demonstration of the total fuel cycle proliferation 
risk concept.  
 
 
  26 
7.0 REFERENCES 
Love, T., McClellan, Y., Rochau, G., York, D., and Inoue, N. (2006) “A Framework and 
Methodology for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Transparency.”  Sandia National Laboratories, 
Albuquerque, NM.  SAND2006-0270. 
 
 
Related Presentations 
 
Mendez, C., Rochau, G., York, D., Inoue, N., “A Demonstration of Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Transparency”, Proceedings 47th INMM Annual Meeting, July 2006. 
 
Rochau, G., Mendez, C., York, D. “Advanced Remote Monitoring for Reprocessing Systems”, 
Proceedings 47th INMM Annual Meeting, July 2006. 
  27 
APPENDIX A:  MATHEMATICAL DETAILS FOR THE DIVERSION RISK 
MODEL 
 
For the purposes of this document, the risk of an event is the product of the probability of the 
occurrence of the event and the consequences of such an event.  This appendix provides the 
mathematical model for the calculation of the probability component of diversion risk. 
 
A.1 Risk Notation 
 
The process step level is the basic level at which risk is calculated in the risk model.  The 
diversion risk from individual steps can be accumulated to report a risk for an individual plant 
process or for plant operations.  However, the following discussion of risk will focus on 
calculating risk at the process step level. 
 
The diversion risk for a specific process step is calculated as the product of the probability of 
diversion of nuclear materials during that step and the consequences of that diversion: 
, , , , , ,i j k i j k i j kR P C= ×  
Ri,j,k denotes the risk of diversion for the i
th
 step of the j
th
 process of the k
th
 plant operation.  For 
the same step, process, and operation combination, Pi,j,k denotes the conditional probability that a 
diversion has occurred, given the data reported by the sensors for that step (see Section 4.4.1).  
The term Ci,j,k denotes the consequence for the same step, process, and plant combination.   
 
A.2 Inputs to the Probability Model 
 
As discussed in Section 4.4.1, the diversion risk model assumes that every process step is 
assumed to have as many associated sensors as are necessary to verify that the remote operation 
took place.  Under this assumption, the probability of diversion for a specific process step can be 
calculated.  The fundamental question that the probability model answers is as follows: 
Given the data reported by the sensors, what is the probability that nuclear 
materials have been diverted from a single process step? 
That is, we need to calculate the probability that a diversion has occurred, conditional upon the 
data reported by the sensors for a single step.  To do so, the probability model requires three sets 
of inputs: 
1. Sh: the result from comparing the expected signal and the observed signal of the h
th
 
intrinsic sensor associated with a process step.  When Sh = 0, the observed signal matches 
the expected signal, and no deviation is logged by the transparency software.  When Sh  = 
1, the observed signal does not match the expected signal, and the transparency software 
logs a deviation from expected operations. 
2. PD: the probability that a diversion will occur at the process step.  This probability is a 
function of several factors and is discussed in Section 4.4.1. 
3. PMh: the probability that the h
th
 sensor will malfunction.  This probability is also 
described in Section 4.4.1. 
The two events (diversion and sensor malfunction) are assumed to be independent in all risk 
calculations.  If PD and PMh are known with precision, they can be taken to be point 
probabilities.  If it is necessary to incorporate uncertainty in these probabilities, they can be 
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considered random variables that have associated probability distributions.  The probability 
model has been developed so that either approach can be used. 
 
A.3 Background Results 
 
Before detailing the probability calculations, it is necessary to state a theorem and lemma that are 
used in the calculations.  The diversion risk model requires the conditional probability that a 
diversion has occurred, given the data reported by the sensors (Section 4.4.1).  Consequently, the 
following results involve the calculation of conditional probabilities. 
 
Theorem 1 (Bayes’ Theorem; Bayes 1764)
 †
: If 1 2, , , kB B BK  constitute a 
partition of the sample space U  and ( ) 0iP B ≠  for 1,2, , ,i k= K  then for any 
event A  in U  such that ( ) 0P A ≠  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
|
|
|
r r
r k
i i
i
P B P A B
P B A
P B P A B
=
=
∑
. 
 
 
Lemma 1
‡
: If A, B, and C are independent events and ( ) 0P C ≠ , then 
( ) ( ) ( )| | | .P A B C P A C P B C=I  
 
These results are used in the development of the probability model. 
 
A.4 Probability Calculation: Single Sensor 
 
Consider the example of a single process step that is monitored by a single sensor.  In this 
example, it is assumed that PD and PM are known with precision, and we model them as point 
probabilities.  We omit the subscript “h” on PM and S in this section because we are assuming 
that only one sensor monitors the process step. 
 
Let P denote the conditional probability that a diversion has occurred during this step, given the 
data reported by the sensor.  Using standard notation for conditional probabilities, we write 
( )|P P D S= , where the variable D  is used to denote the event in which a diversion takes place.  
S is 1 when the transparency software identifies a deviation from expected operations and 0 
when no deviation is identified.  
 
To calculate P, we apply Bayes’ Theorem.  The sample space that we consider is partitioned by 
two events, D  and CD , the complement of D. ( CD  is the event in which no diversion takes 
                                                 
†
 The notation P(A|B) is used to denote the conditional probability of A relative to the sample space S, or as it is 
more commonly stated “the probability of A given B.” 
‡
 The notation A BI  is used to denote the “intersection” of the sets A and B. 
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place.)  Additionally, review of Scenarios 1-4 and Figure 2 in Section 4.4.1 leads to the 
following probabilities that will be used to calculate ( )|P D S : 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1| 1
0 | 1
0 |
1| .
C
C
P S D PM
P S D PM
P S D PM
P S D PM
= = −
= = −
= =
= =
    (1) 
 
We are interested in calculating the probability that a diversion occurs, conditional upon the data 
reported by the sensor.  The probability that a diversion has occurred when a deviation is 
identified (S = 1) is calculated by application of Bayes’ Theorem: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
1|
| 1
1| 1|
1
.
1 1
C C
P D P S D
P D S
P D P S D P D P S D
PD PM
PD PM PD PM
=
= =
= + =
−
=
− + −
 
When no deviation is identified (S = 0), the probability that a diversion has taken place is  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
0 |
| 0
0 | 0 |
.
1 1
C C
P D P S D
P D S
P D P S D P D P S D
PD PM
PD PM PD PM
=
= =
= + =
=
+ − −
 
These equations are appropriate when a process step is monitored by a single sensor and PD and 
PM are modeled as point probabilities. 
 
A.5 Probability Calculation: Multiple Sensors 
 
The equations presented in the previous section can be generalized for a process step with 
multiple sensors.  Consider a process step with ns sensors.  The variable Sh, h=1,2,…, ns, is 1 
when the h
th
 intrinsic sensor sends a signal that does not match the expected signal, and Sh is 0 
when the signal matches the expected signal.  The probability that the h
th
 sensor will malfunction 
is denoted by the term PMh, and it is assumed that the occurrence of a sensor malfunction is 
independent of any other sensor malfunctioning.  Furthermore, we represent all PMh and PD as 
point probabilities in this example.  Thus, given any set of sensor data S1, S2,…,
sn
S , the 
probability that a diversion of nuclear material has occurred during this operation is  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
|
| .
| |
s
s
s s
n
n C C
n n
P D P S S S D
P D S S S
P D P S S S D P D P S S S D
=
+
I IKI
I IKI
I IKI I IKI
 
 
  30 
This result is a simple application of Bayes’ Theorem.  Because the events Sh, h=1, …, ,sn  and 
D are independent, application of Lemma 1 to the numerator in the above equation yields 
equation (2)
*
: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 2
1 1
|
| .
| |
s
s s s
n
h
h
n n n
C C
h h
h h
P D P S D
P D S S S
P D P S D P D P S D
=
= =
=
+
∏
∏ ∏
I IKI   (2) 
 
Finally, the terms in (1) can be combined into the following expressions: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
,  0
| 1 ,  1, ,
1 ,  1
1 ,  0
| 1 ,  1, , .
,  1
h h
h h
S Sh
h s
h
S ShC
h s
h
PM S
P S D PM PM i n
PM S
PM S
P S D PM PM i n
PM S
−
−
= 
= = − = 
− = 
− = 
= = − = 
= 
K
K
   (3) 
 
Replacement of the terms ( )|hP S D  and ( )| ChP S D  with terms on the right-hand side of 
equation (3) results in equation (4). 
 
( )
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 2
1
1
1 1
1 1
|
1
         .
1 1 1
s
s
h h
s s
h h h h
n
n
S S
h h
h
n n
S S S S
h h h h
h h
P D S S S
PD PM PM
PD PM PM PD PM PM
−
=
− −
= =
=
−
− + − −
∏
∏ ∏
I IKI
  (4) 
This equation is appropriate when a process step is monitored by multiple sensors and PD and 
PMh are modeled as point probabilities. 
 
A.6 Risk Calculation 
 
The risk of the diversion of nuclear material during a process step is calculated with the 
following equation: 
, , , , , ,i j k i j k i j kR P C= × .     (5) 
The term Ri,j,k denotes the diversion risk for the i
th
 process step of the j
th
 process in the k
th
 plant 
operation.  Pi,j,k and Ci,j,k denote the conditional probability and consequence of diversion, 
respectively, for that same process step.  When point probabilities are used to calculate Pi,j,k, the 
cumulative diversion risk for the j
th
 process can be calculated by summing the risks from the 
process’s individual process steps: 
                                                 
*
 The notation 
1
k
i
i
A
=
∏  is used to denote the product .i i iA A A× × ×L  
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, , ,j k i j k
i
R R=∑  .     (6) 
The diversion risk for the k
th
 plant operation is calculated by summing the risks from all of the 
plant’s processes: 
, , ,
,
k j k i j k
j i j
R R R= =∑ ∑ .    (7) 
 
A.7 Modeling PM and PD with Probability Distributions 
 
It is reasonable to consider that the probabilities PM and PD will not be known with great 
precision.  In this case, it is appropriate to consider them as random variables with probability 
distributions, and these variables have means and standard deviations (uncertainties).  Rather 
than calculating a single value for the conditional probability P, a mean probability and 
associated standard deviation can be calculated.   
 
The following theorems can be utilized to calculate the mean and standard deviation for the 
probability that a diversion has occurred at a process step (conditional upon the sensor data). 
 
Theorem 2 (Mood et al. 1974): Let X and Y be two random variables with means 
µX and µY, respectively.  If Z=X± Y , then µZ = µX ± µY. 
 
Theorem 3 (Mood et al. 1974): Let X and Y be two random variables with means 
µX and µY, respectively.  If Z X Y= × , then µZ = µXµY+cov[X,Y]. 
 
Theorem 4 (Mood et al. 1974): Let X and Y be random variables with respective 
means µX and µY.  If Z=X/Y, then                              
[ ] [ ]YYX
Y
X
YY
X
Z var,cov
1
32 µ
µ
µµ
µµ +−≈ .  
 
Theorem 5 (Mood et al. 1974): Suppose X and Y are measured with uncertainties 
σX and σY, and the measured values are used to compute Z=X± Y.  If the 
uncertainties in X and Y are known to be independent and random, then the 
uncertainty in Z, σZ, is 
     ( ) ( )2 2Z X Yσ σ σ= + .      
In any case,  
     Z X Yσ σ σ≤ + .       
 
Theorem 6 (Taylor 1982): Suppose X and Y are measured with uncertainties σX 
and σY, and the measured values are used to compute Z X Y= ×  and XW Y= .  
If the uncertainties in X and Y are known to be independent and random, then the 
fractional uncertainties in Z and W, Z
Z
σ
 and W
W
σ
, are 
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2 2
WZ X Y
Z W X Y
σσ σ σ   
= = +      
   
.     
In any case,  
     
Z X Y
Z X Y
σ σ σ
≤ +   
and  
     
W X Y
W X Y
σ σ σ
≤ + . 
 
Theorems 2-4 can be applied to equation (4) to calculate the mean conditional probability, 
denoted µp, and Theorems 5 and 6 must be applied to equation (4) to calculate the standard 
deviation on the conditional probability, denoted σp.  It is evident from these theorems that only 
the means and standard deviations of PM and PD are required to calculate µp and σp.  It is not 
necessary to know the PM and PD distributions. 
 
The mean risk for a process step is calculated by simply multiplying the consequence for that 
step by µp.  Similarly, the standard deviation for the risk of a process step is calculated by 
multiplying the consequence for that step by σp.  The mean risk for a process or plant operation 
is calculated by summing the mean risks of all of the individual process steps associated with 
that process or plant operation.  The standard deviation of the risk for a process or operation must 
be calculated using Theorem 5. 
 
A.8 References 
 
Bayes, T. 1764.  An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances.  Phil. Trans., 
53, 370. (Reproduced in Biometrika, 45, 293(1968), edited and introduced by G. A. Barnard.) 
 
Mood, A. M., F. A. Graybill and D. C. Boes. 1974. Introduction to the Theory of Statistics.  
McGraw-Hill, New York, NY. 
 
Taylor, J. R. 1982.  An Introduction to Error Analysis: The Study of Uncertainties in Physical 
Measurements.  University Science Books, Mill Valley, CA. 
 
  33 
 APPENDIX B:  EXAMPLE DEMONSTRATION OF DIVERSION RISK 
CALCULATION USING POINT PROBABILITIES  
 
This Appendix introduces a demonstration of how the risk model can be applicable to a 
MONJU-Style Fast Reactor based on the types of signals and information that are collected by 
the automation of the process. 
 
B.1 Defining Expected Signals and Observed Signals 
 
Declarations of facility operations are used to develop a set of “expected signals” that represent 
what the facility sensors should transmit if the operation goes according to plan, without any 
deviation. An example of expected signals defining a process step is shown in the table below, 
where “No.” is the sensor number, and “Signal” is the binary status [0 or 1] expected from the 
sensor during the step according to the declared operation.   
 
This example represents Step 10000, where the New Fuel Transfer Machine –NFTM– gripper 
descends to the new fuel storage rack in a path to attain a new fuel assembly.  In this example, 
when a facility declares that Step 10000 will take place, the risk analysis software develops a set 
of expected signals where each sensor in the list returns the signal identified in the table.  
 
These expected signals can be simultaneous or sequential depending on the time standard for 
each activity.  Simultaneous signals are grouped and expected to start at exactly the same time, 
tracking multiple sensors that together describe an event in the process. Sequential signals are 
expected to start immediately after the preceding signals are completed.  (By design, it is 
possible for some sequential signals to overlap with one or more of the sensors in the preceding 
step if those preceding sensors are still active.) The time standard represents how much time is 
required or allotted for each event of the step and is developed in accordance to a time standard 
analysis for the automated activity.   
 
For example, in Table B1
1
, it is expected that when Sensor 7506 signals 1 it indicates that Step 
10000 has begun and the pulse motor driver of the NFTM gripper has started.  To successfully 
fulfill the declared step, it is expected that exactly one second after this signal is received, 
Sensors 7002, 7003, 7506, 7511, and 8908 will report the signals shown in the table during a 
total 21 seconds.  After 21 seconds, Sensors 7002 and 7511 are then expected to report a change 
in their binary status, indicating the completion of Step 10000.    
 
                                                 
1
 Data from the MONJU Fuel Handling Transparency Model. 
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Table B1 
Time Standard No. Signal Comment 
 7506 1 NFTM gripper - hoisting - pulse motor driver start 
Sequential 
1 second past 7506 
7002 1 NFTM gripper - hoisting - pulse motor driver - busy 
Simultaneous with 7002  7003 0 NFTM gripper - hoisting - mechanical origin sensor 
- home position 
Simultaneous with 7002   7506 0 NFTM gripper - hoisting - pulse motor driver start 
Simultaneous with 7002 7511 1 NFTM Indicating Lamp 
Simultaneous with 7002   8908 1  
Sequential 
21 seconds past  8908 
7002 0 NFTM gripper - hoisting - pulse motor driver - busy 
Simultaneous with 7002 7511 0 NFTM Indicating Lamp 
 
“Observed signals” are the binary status [0, 1] transmitted by the sensor while the operation is 
taking place.  During a real-time step, the time standard is measured by the time stamp 
transmitted by the observed signal.  
 
When the information is being transmitted, the risk analysis software performs a comparison 
between the expected and observed signals, using “S” to determine if they are equal or not.  
When S=0, the operation has occurred as expected (expected = observed).  When S=1, the sensor 
has reported a deviation from expectations (expected ≠ observed).   
 
Table B2 summarizes an example of this comparison. Where S = 1, for Sensors 7003 and 7506, 
indicates that these sensors failed to transmit the expected binary status during actual operations.  
“S = 1” represents a flag where observations do not meet the expectations. The risk analysis 
software uses this information to initiate the risk calculation algorithm.  Physically, the sensors 
track the progress of the step in the model, providing insight into and considering the potential 
diversion pathway.  The failed sensors in the example indicate that the model NFTM gripper was 
not in the original position (7003) and the motor driver failed to shut down (7506).   
 
Table B2 
Time Stamp No. 
Expected 
Signal 
Observed 
Signal S Comment 
60726095356 7506 1 1 0 
NFTM gripper - hoisting - pulse motor 
driver start 
60726095357 7002 1 1 0 
NFTM gripper - hoisting - pulse motor 
driver - busy 
60726095357 7003 0 1 1 
NFTM gripper - hoisting - mechanical 
origin sensor - home position 
60726095357 7506 0 1 1 
NFTM gripper - hoisting - pulse motor 
driver start 
60726095357 7511 1 1 0 NFTM Indicating Lamp 
60726095357 8908 1 1 0  
60726095418 7002 0 0 0 
NFTM gripper - hoisting - pulse motor 
driver - busy 
60726095418 7511 0 0 0 NFTM Indicating Lamp 
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B.2 Diversion Risk for Single Sensor Process Steps 
 
The diversion risk can be calculated for any step, process and operation in the system, including 
those defined by a single sensor.  This is the simplest case, where the consequence of diversion is 
defined by the number of SQ’s handled during the step, and the probability of diversion at the 
step is calculated by comparing the expectations and observations of that single sensor. 
 
Figure 5 introduces the algorithm for evaluating the signals during practical application, when a 
step is defined by a single sensor.   
 
 
 
Figure 5: Calculating P for a Process Step with a Single Sensor 
 
The following example shows both the comparison between expected and observed signals and 
the formula used for risk calculation in each of the possible outcomes (i.e., “expectations meet 
observations” and “expectations do not meet observations”).  Although there is no step in the 
MONJU model that is solely defined by a single sensor, for the purpose of this example, we will 
consider the case of a step defined by the NFTM gripper latching to new fuel (Step 10001, 
Sensor 7005). 
 
We will assume that the Probability of Diversion (PD) for this step is known as .9 and that the 
Probability of Malfunction(PM) for sensor 7005 is known as .001.  Furthermore, we will assume 
that .5 SQ is handled during this step.  Then, in Table B3: 
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Table B3 
 EXAMPLE A EXAMPLE B 
 If expectations meet observation
2
 If expectations do not meet observations
3
 
1 
1.a 
1.b 
1.c 
Assumptions 
PD = .9 
PM = .001 
SQ = .5 SQ/step 
 
PD = .9 
PM = .001 
SQ = .5 SQ/step 
 
Probability Calculation 
2 
2.a 
2.b 
Sensor input 
Expectation Value = 0 
Observation Value = 0  
 
Expectation Value = 0 
Observation Value = 1  
3 
3.a 
Logical Test  
YES = No deviation is reported 
 
NO = Deviation is reported 
4 
4.a 
4.b 
4.c 
Inputs 
S = 0 
PD = .9 
PM = .001 
 
S = 1 
PD = .9 
PM = .001 
5 
5.1 
Formula 
( )( )1 1
PD PM
P
PD PM PD PM
×
=
× + − −
 
 
( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1
PD PM
P
PD PM PD PM
−
=
− + −
 
6 
6.1 
Results: Probability of Diversion 
P = 8.9E-3 
 
P = .99 
 
Diversion Risk 
7 
7.1 
7.2 
Inputs 
P = 8.9E-3 
C = .5 SQ/step 
 
P = .99 
C = .5 SQ/step 
8 
8.1 
Formula 
, , , , , ,i j k i j k i j kR P C= ×  
 
, , , , , ,i j k i j k i j kR P C= ×  
9 
9.1 
Risk 
R = 4.4E-3 SQ/step 
 
R = .49 SQ/step 
 
                                                 
2
 The calculation to be performed if “Expectations meet Observations” is the process to calculate the Expected Risk 
for each sensor.   
3
 The calculation to be performed if “Expectations do not meet Observations” is the process to calculate the 
Observed Risk for each sensor.   
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B.3 Diversion Risk for Multi-Sensor Steps 
 
The calculation of the risk of process steps that are defined and verified by multiple sensors is 
more complex than the previous case.  While the consequence of diversion is still defined by the 
number of SQ’s handled during the step, the probability of diversion at the step is calculated by 
comparing the expectations and observations for every single sensor. 
 
Figure 6 introduces the algorithm for evaluating the signals during practical application, when a 
step is defined by multiple sensors.   
 
 
Figure 6: Calculating P for a Process Step with Multiple Sensors 
 
The following examples show the practical application for calculating diversion risk for a step 
with multiple sensors.   
 
EXAMPLE C:  All observations meet expectations, same PM for each sensor. 
For the purpose of this example, we will consider the NFTM gripper descent to new fuel storage 
rack (Step 10000) which is defined by sensors described in Table B4. 
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Table B4 
h Time/Date No. Signal Comment 
1 60726095356 7506 1 
NFTM gripper - hoisting - pulse motor driver 
start 
2 60726095357 7002 1 
NFTM gripper - hoisting - pulse motor driver 
- busy 
3 60726095357 7003 0 
NFTM gripper - hoisting - mechanical origin 
sensor - home position 
4 60726095357 7506 0 
NFTM gripper - hoisting - pulse motor driver 
start 
5 60726095357 7511 1 NFTM Indicating Lamp 
6 60726095357 8908 1  
7 60726095357 8908 0  
8 60726095418 7002 0 
NFTM gripper - hoisting - pulse motor driver 
- busy 
9 60726095418 7511 0 NFTM Indicating Lamp 
 
 
The time stamp field indicates the sensor signals that are received simultaneously, and those that 
are received sequentially, in the following format.   
 
As in the previous example, we will assume that the Probability of Diversion (PD) for this step is 
known as .9 and that the Probability of Malfunction for each sensor is known as .001.  We will 
also assume that .5 SQ is handled during this step.   
 
Then, the Probability of Diversion (P) can be calculated according to Table B5: 
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Table B5 
h No. 
E
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
S
i
g
n
a
l
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
e
d
 
S
i
g
n
a
l
 
Test Sh PMh 
1-
Sh 1-PMh 
PMh^ 
(1-Sh) 
(1-PMh) 
^Sh 
PMh^ 
(1-Sh)* 
(1-PMh) 
^Sh 
PMh
^Sh 
(1-PMh) 
^(1-Sh) 
PMh^Sh* 
(1-PMh) 
^(1-Sh) 
1 7506 1 1 YES 0 0.001 1 0.999 0.001 1 0.001 1 0.999 0.999 
2 7002 1 1 YES 0 0.001 1 0.999 0.001 1 0.001 1 0.999 0.999 
3 7003 0 0 YES 0 0.001 1 0.999 0.001 1 0.001 1 0.999 0.999 
4 7506 0 0 YES 0 0.001 1 0.999 0.001 1 0.001 1 0.999 0.999 
5 7511 1 1 YES 0 0.001 1 0.999 0.001 1 0.001 1 0.999 0.999 
6 8908 1 1 YES 0 0.001 1 0.999 0.001 1 0.001 1 0.999 0.999 
7 8908 0 0 YES 0 0.001 1 0.999 0.001 1 0.001 1 0.999 0.999 
8 7002 0 0 YES 0 0.001 1 0.999 0.001 1 0.001 1 0.999 0.999 
9 7511 0 0 YES 0 0.001 1 0.999 0.001 1 0.001 1 0.999 0.999 
 
 
Finally, the Diversion risk for Step 10000 is 
calculated in accordance to , , , , , ,i j k i j k i j kR P C= × .   
 
Where  P = 9.0E-27  
C = .5 SQ   
 
So, R = 4.5E-27 SQ/step 
 R = ~0 
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EXAMPLE D:  All observations meet expectations, different PM for various sensors. 
For the purpose of this example, we will consider the NFTM gripper latch new fuel (Step 
10001) which is defined by sensors described in Table B6. 
 
Table B6 
h Time/Date No. Signal Comment 
1 60726095418 7510 1 NFTM gripper - DC motor - start 
2 60726095418 7511 1 NFTM Indicating Lamp 
3 60726095419 7004 1 NFTM gripper - delatch sensor 
4 60726095421 7005 0 NFTM gripper - latch sensor 
5 60726095421 7510 0 NFTM gripper - DC motor - start 
6 60726095421 7511 0 NFTM Indicating Lamp 
 
As in the previous examples, we will assume that the Probability of Diversion (PD) for 
this step is known as .9 and that that .5 SQ is handled during this step.  The Probability of 
Malfunction for each sensor is known and the Probability of Diversion (P) can be 
calculated according to Table B7: 
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Table B7 
h No. 
E
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
S
i
g
n
a
l
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
e
d
 
S
i
g
n
a
l
 
Test Sh PMh 
1-
Sh 1-PMh 
PMh^ 
(1-Sh) 
(1-PMh) 
^Sh 
PMh^ 
(1-Sh)* 
(1-PMh) 
^Sh 
PMh^
Sh 
(1-PMh) 
^(1-Sh) 
PMh^Sh* 
(1-PMh) 
^(1-Sh) 
1 7510 1 1 YES 0 0.001 1 0.999 0.001 1 0.001 1 0.999 0.999 
2 7511 1 1 YES 0 0.05 1 0.95 0.05 1 0.05 1 0.95 0.95 
3 7004 1 1 YES 0 0.001 1 0.999 0.001 1 0.001 1 0.999 0.999 
4 7005 0 0 YES 0 0.001 1 0.999 0.001 1 0.001 1 0.999 0.999 
5 7510 0 0 YES 0 0.01 1 0.99 0.01 1 0.01 1 0.99 0.99 
6 7511 0 0 YES 0 0.05 1 0.95 0.05 1 0.05 1 0.95 0.95 
 
 
Finally, the Diversion risk for Step 10001 is calculated in 
accordance to , , , , , ,i j k i j k i j kR P C= × .   
 
Where  P = 2.5E-13  
C = .5 SQ   
 
So, R = 1.2E-13 SQ/step 
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EXAMPLE E:  Some observations do not meet expectations. 
For the purpose of this example, we will consider the NFTM ascent to starting point (Step 
10002) which is defined by sensors described in the following table. 
 
Table B8 
h Time/Date No. Signal Comment 
1 60726095422 7505 1 
NFTM gripper - hoisting - pulse motor driver - changeover 
of operation mode 
2 60726095422 7506 1 NFTM gripper - hoisting - pulse motor driver start 
3 60726095422 7002 1 NFTM gripper - hoisting - pulse motor driver - busy 
4 60726095422 7506 0 NFTM gripper - hoisting - pulse motor driver start 
5 60726095422 7511 1 NFTM Indicating Lamp 
6 60726095431 7204 0  
7 60726095443 7511 0 NFTM Indicating Lamp 
8 60726095444 7002 0 NFTM gripper - hoisting - pulse motor driver - busy 
9 60726095444 7003 1 
NFTM gripper - hoisting - mechanical origin sensor - home 
position 
10 60726095444 7505 0 
NFTM gripper - hoisting - pulse motor driver - changeover 
of operation mode 
 
In this example, several sensors observations do not meet expectations.  Namely, all the 
sensors associated with the NFTM gripper-hoisting report a deviation from expectations.   
 
As in the previous examples, we will assume that the Probability of Diversion (PD) for 
this step is known as .9 and that that .5 SQ is handled during this step.  The Probability of 
Malfunction for each sensor is known and the Probability of Diversion (P) can be 
calculated according to Table B9: 
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Table B9 
h No. 
E
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
S
i
g
n
a
l
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
e
d
 
S
i
g
n
a
l
 
Test Sh PMh 
1-
Sh 1-PMh 
PMh^ 
(1-Sh) 
(1-PMh) 
^Sh 
PMh^ 
(1-Sh)* 
(1-PMh) 
^Sh 
PMh^
Sh 
(1-PMh) 
^(1-Sh) 
PMh^Sh* 
(1-PMh) 
^(1-Sh) 
1 7505 1 1 YES 0 0.001 1 0.999 0.001 1 0.001 1 0.999 0.999 
2 7506 1 1 YES 0 0.001 1 0.999 0.001 1 0.001 1 0.999 0.999 
3 7002 1 0 NO 1 0.01 0 0.99 1 0.99 0.99 0.01 1 0.01 
4 7506 0 1 NO 1 0.05 0 0.95 1 0.95 0.95 0.05 1 0.05 
5 7511 1 1 YES 0 0.05 1 0.95 0.05 1 0.05 1 0.95 0.95 
6 7204 0 0 YES 0 0.05 1 0.95 0.05 1 0.05 1 0.95 0.95 
7 7511 0 0 YES 0 0.001 1 0.999 0.001 1 0.001 1 0.999 0.999 
8 7002 0 1 NO 1 0.001 0 0.999 1 0.999 0.999 0.001 1 0.001 
9 7003 1 0 NO 1 0.001 0 0.999 1 0.999 0.999 0.001 1 0.001 
10 7505 0 1 NO 1 0.05 0 0.95 1 0.95 0.95 0.05 1 0.05 
 
 
Finally, the Diversion risk for Step 10002 is 
calculated in accordance to , , , , , ,i j k i j k i j kR P C= × .   
 
Where  P = .47  
C = .5 SQ   
 
So, R = .23 SQ/step 
  
B.4 Accumulation of Risk 
 
Diversion Risk can be accumulated to account for all the steps in a process, processes in 
operations, and operations in a facility.  The cumulative diversion risk can be calculated by 
summing the risks from the facility individual operations, processes and steps. 
 
Taking as an example the Diversion Risk calculated in Examples C, D and E for steps 10000 to 
10002, the Diversion Risk for the process comprising these three steps can be calculated as 
follows:   
 
Step Diversion Risk 
10000 ~0 SQ/step 
10001 1.2E-13 SQ/step 
10002 .23 SQ/step 
, , ,j k i j k
i
R R=∑  .23 SQ/process 
 
B.5 Understanding the Range of Diversion Risk Results 
 
The magnitude of diversion risk can vary greatly from one step, process or operation to the next, 
as seen in the summary tables below: 
   
Single Sensor Example 
   
Step Diversion Risk Comments 
10000 4.4E-3 SQ/step A.  Operation meets expectations 
10001 .49 SQ/step B.  Operation does not meet 
expectations 
 
 
Multiple Sensors Example 
   
Step Diversion Risk Comments 
10000 4.5E-27 SQ/step C.  9 sensors.  
     Operation met expectations 
10001 1.2E-13 SQ/step D.  6 sensors.  
      Operation met expectations 
10002 .23 SQ/step E.  10 sensors.  
      Operation did not meet 
expectations on 5 sensors 
, , ,j k i j k
i
R R=∑  .23 SQ/process 
Full process Risk of Diversion is 
governed by the risk of diversion at 
the step where sensors detected a 
diversion. 
 
  
The result of the diversion risk algorithm is a factor of PD, PM, SQ and whether the sensors 
detect a deviation or not.  The large variation in diversion risk values seen in the example (from 
1E-2 to 1E-28) can be explained by two main factors:  
 Number of sensors in the step 
 Number of deviations detected in multi-sensor steps 
 
For a single sensor step, as seen in examples A and B (where PM, PD and SQ were kept 
constant), the higher diversion risk was obtained when the step did not meet expectations.  This 
indicates an increase in risk when deviations between expectations and observations are detected, 
which is compatible with the conceptual framework of the model.  However, while an increase in 
risk is expected because there is only one opportunity (one sensor) to detect a deviation, there is 
also only one point for measurement. Therefore, when a deviation is detected, there are no 
mitigating measurements to mitigate the increase in risk (the difference in results between 
examples A and B changed from the order of 1E-3 when no deviation was detected to 
approximately .5 when deviation was detected).  
 
For a multi-sensor step, as seen in examples C, D and E, the higher diversion risk was also 
obtained when steps did not meet expectations (in the order of 1E-2 with 5 deviations detected).   
However, in multi-sensor cases where steps met expectations, the diversion risk was lower when 
more sensors were available.  This is because if the sensors are functioning properly there is 
more opportunity to detect a deviation and thus less chance that diversion will go undetected.   
 
Finally, it is expected (as shown in the accumulation of risk results) that once diversion risk is 
summed for every step, process, and operation, the diversion risk value will be determined by the 
risk of diversion at the steps or processes where sensors detect a deviation since the risk at other 
steps or processes might be too small to be of significance in the summation. 
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